Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction December 2014

“SIGAR’s experience in Afghanistan, as well as the experience of other oversight agencies, has shown that there are several sources of risk in implementing reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. These include (but are not limited to):
• limited institutional and human-capital capacity in Afghan institutions
• operational demands and constraints imposed by an active insurgency
• widespread corruption in Afghan society and government entities
• Afghan reluctance or inability to impose accountability, especially on the wealthy or well-connected in government and society
• poor record keeping and data retention by U.S. agencies and Afghan entities
• frequent personnel turnover and loss of U.S. agencies’ incountry institutional memory
• U.S. oversight personnel’s noncompliance with existing rules and regulations
• lack of adequate, coordinated, context-sensitive planning to guide program conduct
• failure to give due weight to sustainability in considering projects for Afghan control
• limited visibility into Afghan records
Even in conflict-free areas, no reconstruction or development project is without risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. In conflict areas where security concerns and instability are high, the risk is much greater. But the evidence is clear that American taxpayer dollars and American strategic and humanitarian interests in Afghanistan are being placed at unnecessarily high levels of risk by widespread failure to anticipate problems and to implement prudent countermeasures.”