Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

• 09-004 Iraq Reconstruction Project Terminations Represent a Range of Actions, October 27, 2008: “As of June 2008, SIGIR identified 1,262 DoD Iraq reconstruction projects that have been terminated, including 732 for the convenience of the government, and 530 for default on the part of the contractor. These terminated projects had initial obligations of nearly $1 billion of which approximately $600 million has been paid to contractors, including $89.7 million to contractors on projects terminated for default. Although a few projects were nearly completed at termination, the vast majority were not. SIGIR selected 195 terminations for more detailed review, drawing largely from projects valued at $1 million or more, representing about 80 percent of the projects’ initial obligation amounts.”
• 09-001 Opportunities to Enhance U.S. Democracy-Building Strategy for Iraq, October 22, 2008: “DoS and USAID have developed a U.S. strategy for advancing and strengthening democracy and governance in Iraq. The strategy contains a number of characteristics that are necessary for an effective strategic plan. At the same time, the strategy can be enhanced as a planning tool and vehicle for informing the Congress about progress toward achieving the plan’s strategic objectives.”
• 09-003 Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Local Governance Program Contracts with Research Triangle Institute, October 21, 2008: “DoS and USAID have developed a U.S. strategy for advancing and strengthening democracy and governance in Iraq. The strategy contains a number of characteristics that are necessary for an effective strategic plan. At the same time, the strategy can be enhanced as a planning tool and vehicle for informing the Congress about progress toward achieving the plan’s strategic objectives.”
• 09-002 Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue, October 21, 2008: “The data on ISF assigned and trained continue to contain inaccuracies, and comparability among reports is difficult because of changing metrics and definitions. Inaccuracies in the data persist because Iraq’s payroll systems contain improper documentation and reporting of personnel actions by Iraqi officials and unauthorized employees. They also contain inconsistent information as a result of corrupt and irregular practices. In addition, the usefulness of data on Iraqi police assigned and trained continues to be limited because not all police assigned to the force have been trained. Furthermore, not all those trained—both police and military—are available for duty: some of those reported as assigned have completed their obligations, some are on leave or absent without leave, and others have been injured, or killed. Because reporting metrics and definitions have changed, meaningful trend analysis remains difficult.”