Graham, Benjamin A. T. and Miller, Michael K. and Strom, Kaare, Powersharing and Democratic Development (November 26, 2014). Available for download at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2531118

“Which institutions best promote democratic development? Does this differ in post-conflict settings? Many scholars recommend powersharing institutions that guarantee stakes in power for distinct groups, but this can conflict with electoral responsiveness. Despite a large literature relating powersharing to conflict renewal, there is little empirical work on whether powersharing promotes democratic development. To fill this gap, we distinguish between three types of powersharing and separately test their effects on democratization and democratic survival. We further compare post-conflict and other cases. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find sharp distinctions based on the type of powersharing and the political context. Institutions that guarantee group representation in the central government are positive for democratic survival, but only post-conflict. In contrast, institutions that disperse power, such as federalism, are negative for post-conflict democratic survival, questioning a common approach to conflict settlement. Our strongest finding is a consistent positive role for institutions that constrain leaders. Clear implications are drawn for the institutional designs that promote durable democracies.”