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New Reports from Office of Financial Research

  • The Influence of Systemic Importance Indicators on Banks’ Credit Default Swap Spreads by Jill Cetina and Bert Loudis. “This paper examines credit default swap (CDS) spreads in a sample of international banks for evidence of a benefit related to possible measures of systemic importance. The authors find a consistent, statistically significant negative relationship between five-year CDS spreads of banks and nine different systemic importance indicators. The paper shows that the benefit is most pronounced for banks within a certain asset range. Such evidence is weaker for banks identified by regulators as global systemically important banks.”
  • Are the Borrowing Costs of Large Financial Firms Unusual?  by Javed Ahmed, Christopher Anderson, and Rebecca Zarutskie. “This paper examines evidence of a too-big-to-fail subsidy for large financial firms by comparing borrowing costs of large and small firms across industries. The paper finds that larger firms borrow more cheaply in many industries, and this size effect is often largest in nonfinancial industries. These results challenge the notion that expected government bailouts are behind borrowing cost advantages enjoyed by the largest financial firms.”
  • Systemic Risk: The Dynamics under Central Clearing by Agostino Capponi, W. Allen Cheng, and Sriram Rajan. “This paper develops a model for concentration risks that clearing members pose to central counterparties. Over time, larger clearing members crowd out smaller clearing members. Systemic risk is created because high clearing member concentration results in relatively lower lending, higher cost of capital, and increasingly costly hedging. To address this risk, the paper proposes a self-funding systemic risk charge.”

  • Hidden Illiquidity with Multiple Central Counterparties by Paul Glasserman, Ciamac C. Moallemi, and Kai Yuan. “This paper focuses on the systemic risks in markets cleared by multiple central counterparties (CCPs). Each CCP charges margins based on the potential impact from the default of a clearing member and subsequent liquidation of a large position. Swaps dealers can split their positions among multiple CCPs, effectively “hiding” potential liquidation costs. A lack of coordination among CCPs can lead to a “race to the bottom” because CCPs with lower perceived liquidation costs can drive competitors out of the market.”
  • The Effect of Negative Equity on Mortgage Default: Evidence from HAMP PRA by Therese C. Scharlemann and Stephen H. Shore. ” This paper uses data from the Home Affordable Modification Program to examine the impact of principal forgiveness on mortgage default. On average 3.1 percent of loans become delinquent and exit the program each quarter. The authors estimate that the rate would have been 3.8 percent absent principal forgiveness, which averaged 28 percent of the initial mortgage balance.”

 

 

 

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