CRS – Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses. Kenneth Katzman,  Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. October 1, 2014

“Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. However, a common enemy has emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian interests. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran’s support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran’s nuclear program came to the fore in 2002, and the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine that program to purely peaceful purposes. The pressure has harmed Iran’s economy and might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran’s international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement (“Joint Plan of Action,” JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. In advance of a November 24, 2014 deadline for the JPA to expire, the search for a “comprehensive solution” on the nuclear issue remains impeded by substantial differences over Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium. Talks to try to finalize a comprehensive deal began September 18 and will continue until that deadline. Rouhani’s presidency, the JPA, and the threat posed by the Islamic State organization have Rouhani’s presidency, the JPA, and the threat posed by the Islamic State organization have Rouhani’s presidency, the JPA, and the threat posed by the Islamic State organization have improved prospects to end the 34 years of U.S.-Iran estrangement. Senior level U.S.-Iran talks are held regularly, no longer confined to the nuclear talks but broadening to regional issues, particularly the advances of the Islamic State organization, and the issue of American citizens detained in Iran. The nuclear talks also have eased tensions between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf region, who are all allies of the United States. However, the Gulf states, Israel, and other regional states still express concern that Iran’s reintegration into the region and the international community will give Iran additional political and economic resources to support movements and regimes in the region that oppose U.S. and U.S.-allied interests. State Department reports on international terrorism assert that Iran continues to provide funds and arms to a wide range of movements, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria, Iraqi Shiite militias, and rebels in Yemen and Bahrain. President Obama has asserted, both before and after the JPA was agreed, that the option of U.S. military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities is available. However, further U.S.—or Israeli—discussion of military options against Iran is unlikely unless nuclear talks collapse outright. In line with a JPA provision that no new sanctions be imposed on Iran during the JPA period, the Administration has threatened to veto bills, including S. 1881, that would add sanctions on Iran—whether or not their provisions would take effect only after the JPA expires. Rouhani’s unexpected election win—a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the 2009 election results—appeared to demonstrate strong support for domestic reform. But, Iran’s judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters. Still, some political prisoners have been released and some media restrictions have been eased since Rouhani took office.”