“This is the first of a two-part review of the way in which certain network structures create advantage. I focus on replicated research results (occasionally presenting new results that link replicated results) concerning the two core principles about network advantage: brokerage and closure. This first part is about brokerage. The argument is that information and practice become sticky within dense social clusters such that network brokers — the people who connect across the structural holes between clusters — have information breadth, timing, and arbitrage advantages that make brokers more likely and able to detect and develop rewarding opportunities. Network brokers tend to be high achievers: better compensated than peers, more positively evaluated, more likely candidates for senior position, and more recognized as leaders in their organization and industry. The criterion evidence for brokerage as a network advantage is that higher achievement is associated with more access to structural holes. I discuss implications for network leadership and close with four cautions about factors that can limit the achievement associated with brokerage.” Download Publication | Download Copenhagen presentation slides. This handout was prepared as a basis for discussion in executive education (Copyright © 2015 Ronald S. Burt, all rights reserved).
- “Network Structure of Advantage, Governance: Closure, Trust, Status, and Reputation,” August 2014 draft chapter in a book tentatively titled Structural Holes in Virtual Worlds – “This is the second of a two-part review of the way in which certain network structures create advantage. I focus on replicated research results (occasionally presenting new results that link replicated results) concerning the two core principles about network advantage: brokerage and closure. This second part is about closure. Closure provides governance within a network; maintaining stability and safety while people get better at what they already know. The gist of the argument is that dense communication channels in a closed network make it likely that behavior and opinion inconsistent with group standards will be detected and discussed. With detection and discussion likely, behavior inconsistent with group standards carries a reputation cost that makes bad behavior less likely, which lowers the risk of trust, thereby increasing the probability of trust. The criterion evidence for closure as a network advantage is that trust is more likely, and reputations more persistent, where people are more embedded in a closed network. Why this is so, and how it produces network metrics diagnostic of coordination, development, and diversity issues in an organization are the subject of this chapter. More, the brokerage and closure principles are linked in that the audience targeted to accept a broker’s information has to accept the would-be broker as a reputable source. Network brokers bridging across groups have an advantage in producing new ideas and growth (Chapter 2), but their advantage is held accountable to company interests through trust and reputation created by audiences inside the closed networks defining groups (Chapter 3).
- Download Publication | Download Madrid presentation slides
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